A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War From Stalin to Gorbachev by Vladislav M. Zubok

Author:Vladislav M. Zubok [Zubok, Vladislav M.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Russia & the Former Soviet Union, Political Science, Political Ideologies, Communism; Post-Communism & Socialism
ISBN: 9780807899052
Google: 3j2VJj1hs1EC
Publisher: Univ of North Carolina Press
Published: 2009-01-31T19:00:00+00:00

TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP

The Brezhnev-Nixon partnership was challenged by the sudden outbreak of the Yom Kippur War on October 6, 1973. The Soviet role in this war has long been the subject of great controversy. Today this story can be analyzed with much more clarity, thanks to the recollections of ex-Soviet veterans, above all the senior Soviet diplomat Viktor Israelyan. A key player in this outbreak was Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, who prepared the surprise attack against Israel in an effort to restore Arab pride and lost territories. He kept the Politburo and Soviet representatives in Egypt in the dark—although, of course, the KGB and the military must have known about the preparations. As with the North Vietnamese earlier, the Kremlin leaders could not control or restrain their foreign clients.36

After Nixon went to Moscow, the Egyptian leader, upset that the Soviet-American rapprochement might mean joint support of the status quo in the Middle East, began to contemplate a double game. He announced the eviction of 17,000 Soviet military advisers and experts from Egypt. Nixon immediately sent a personal word to Brezhnev via the back channel that he did not know anything about Sadat’s decision and had had no secret contact with him. In reality, the United States quickly responded to the secret signals from Sadat.37

Brezhnev was concerned by Egyptian and Syrian preparations. He would have preferred to work with the United States to prevent another war in the Middle East. During his trip to Washington in the summer of 1973, he warned Nixon that Moscow could hardly control its Arab friends. Nixon and Kissinger did not take Brezhnev’s warnings seriously and did not pursue the subject. Kissinger’s goal was to undermine Soviet influence in the Middle East, and therefore he refused to accept Moscow’s role as an architect of peace there. Besides, preoccupied with the American exit from Vietnam, the Americans did not see the gathering clouds in this other region.38 Facing American reluctance to act together, the Soviet leadership did not see any reason to alert Israel about the impending Arab attack.39

Soviet political and military leaders wanted to help Anwar Sadat defeat Israel and to regain Egyptian territories. At the same time, they were certain from the start of the war that the Arabs would lose it. This forecast proved correct, and they moved to prevent a complete collapse of their Arab allies. During the roller coaster of the Yom Kippur War, Brezhnev had to wear two hats: one as Politburo leader and another as the détente statesman. He accomplished this with surprising skill. He deftly neutralized the hard-liners who wanted drastic actions. For instance, he sent Kosygin, who demanded action, on a secret mission to Cairo; there the Soviet premier wasted his time and energy trying to get Sadat to follow Soviet advice. And he cut out Podgorny, whose belligerence was rivaled only by his ignorance.40 The Kremlin leader consistently asserted his priority to be that of working together with the U.S. administration in the spirit of détente, the Basic Principles, and the agreement to prevent nuclear war.

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